diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index f0f65f9..50fd4b8 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -160,6 +160,12 @@ Please refer to the [release page](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases/ # running from unless specified. Example URLs are https://github.com or # https://my-ghes-server.example.com github-server-url: '' + + # Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by + # `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. See [Pwn Requests](todo:need-link) for + # the risks. Set to `true` only after reviewing the risks. + # Default: false + allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: '' ``` diff --git a/__test__/git-auth-helper.test.ts b/__test__/git-auth-helper.test.ts index ad3566a..3c4f049 100644 --- a/__test__/git-auth-helper.test.ts +++ b/__test__/git-auth-helper.test.ts @@ -1173,7 +1173,8 @@ async function setup(testName: string): Promise { sshUser: '', workflowOrganizationId: 123456, setSafeDirectory: true, - githubServerUrl: githubServerUrl + githubServerUrl: githubServerUrl, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false } } diff --git a/__test__/input-helper.test.ts b/__test__/input-helper.test.ts index 09331eb..25b6d18 100644 --- a/__test__/input-helper.test.ts +++ b/__test__/input-helper.test.ts @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => { expect(settings.repositoryOwner).toBe('some-owner') expect(settings.repositoryPath).toBe(gitHubWorkspace) expect(settings.setSafeDirectory).toBe(true) + expect(settings.allowUnsafePrCheckout).toBe(false) }) it('qualifies ref', async () => { diff --git a/__test__/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.test.ts b/__test__/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9634618 --- /dev/null +++ b/__test__/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +import * as github from '@actions/github' +import {assertSafePrCheckout} from '../lib/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper' + +// Shallow clone original @actions/github context +const originalContext = {...github.context} +const originalEventName = github.context.eventName +const originalPayload = github.context.payload + +const BASE_REPO_ID = 100 +const FORK_REPO_ID = 200 +const PR_HEAD_SHA = '1111111111111111111111111111111111111111' +const PR_MERGE_SHA = '2222222222222222222222222222222222222222' +const SAFE_BASE_SHA = '3333333333333333333333333333333333333333' +const WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA = '4444444444444444444444444444444444444444' +const BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO = 'some-owner/some-repo' + +function setContext(eventName: string, payload: object): void { + ;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = eventName + ;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = payload +} + +function forkPullRequestTargetPayload(): object { + return { + repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID}, + pull_request: { + head: { + sha: PR_HEAD_SHA, + repo: {id: FORK_REPO_ID} + }, + merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA + } + } +} + +function sameRepoPullRequestTargetPayload(): object { + return { + repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID}, + pull_request: { + head: { + sha: PR_HEAD_SHA, + repo: {id: BASE_REPO_ID} + }, + merge_commit_sha: PR_MERGE_SHA + } + } +} + +function forkWorkflowRunPayload(): object { + return { + repository: {id: BASE_REPO_ID}, + workflow_run: { + event: 'pull_request', + head_commit: {id: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA}, + head_repository: {id: FORK_REPO_ID} + } + } +} + +describe('unsafe-pr-checkout-helper', () => { + beforeAll(() => { + jest.spyOn(github.context, 'repo', 'get').mockReturnValue({ + owner: 'some-owner', + repo: 'some-repo' + }) + }) + + afterEach(() => { + ;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = originalEventName + ;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = originalPayload + }) + + afterAll(() => { + ;(github.context as {eventName: string}).eventName = + originalContext.eventName + ;(github.context as {payload: object}).payload = originalContext.payload + jest.restoreAllMocks() + }) + + it('allows pull_request events untouched', () => { + setContext('pull_request', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: 'attacker/fork', + ref: 'refs/pull/1/merge', + commit: '', + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).not.toThrow() + }) + + it('allows pull_request_target default checkout (base branch)', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: 'refs/heads/main', + commit: SAFE_BASE_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).not.toThrow() + }) + + it('allows same-repo pull_request_target checkout of PR head', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', sameRepoPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: PR_HEAD_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).not.toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR head SHA checkout', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: PR_HEAD_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow(/Refusing to check out fork pull request code/) + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR merge_commit_sha checkout', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: PR_MERGE_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow(/allow-unsafe-pr-checkout/) + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR ref pattern (head)', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: 'refs/pull/42/head', + commit: '', + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target fork PR ref pattern (merge)', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: 'refs/pull/42/merge', + commit: '', + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target when repository points at the fork', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: 'attacker/fork', + ref: 'refs/heads/main', + commit: '', + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target ignoring repository case differences', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: 'SOME-OWNER/SOME-REPO', + ref: '', + commit: PR_HEAD_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses pull_request_target ignoring commit SHA case differences', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: PR_HEAD_SHA.toUpperCase(), + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('allows pull_request_target fork PR checkout when opted in', () => { + setContext('pull_request_target', forkPullRequestTargetPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: 'refs/pull/42/merge', + commit: '', + allowUnsafePrCheckout: true + }) + ).not.toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses workflow_run fork PR head_commit.id checkout', () => { + setContext('workflow_run', forkWorkflowRunPayload()) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('refuses workflow_run with pull_request_target underlying event', () => { + const payload = forkWorkflowRunPayload() as { + workflow_run: {event: string} + } + payload.workflow_run.event = 'pull_request_target' + setContext('workflow_run', payload) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).toThrow() + }) + + it('allows workflow_run same-repo PR (head_repository.id matches base)', () => { + const payload = forkWorkflowRunPayload() as { + workflow_run: {head_repository: {id: number}} + } + payload.workflow_run.head_repository.id = BASE_REPO_ID + setContext('workflow_run', payload) + expect(() => + assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository: BASE_QUALIFIED_REPO, + ref: '', + commit: WORKFLOW_RUN_HEAD_COMMIT_SHA, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: false + }) + ).not.toThrow() + }) +}) diff --git a/action.yml b/action.yml index 767c416..d69cdc1 100644 --- a/action.yml +++ b/action.yml @@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ inputs: github-server-url: description: The base URL for the GitHub instance that you are trying to clone from, will use environment defaults to fetch from the same instance that the workflow is running from unless specified. Example URLs are https://github.com or https://my-ghes-server.example.com required: false + allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: + description: > + Required to check out fork pull request code from a workflow triggered by + `pull_request_target` or `workflow_run`. See [Pwn Requests](todo:need-link) + for the risks. Set to `true` only after reviewing the risks. + default: false outputs: ref: description: 'The branch, tag or SHA that was checked out' diff --git a/dist/index.js b/dist/index.js index 906b59a..cf9067d 100644 --- a/dist/index.js +++ b/dist/index.js @@ -2023,6 +2023,7 @@ const core = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(2186)); const fsHelper = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(7219)); const github = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(5438)); const path = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(1017)); +const unsafePrCheckoutHelper = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(843)); const workflowContextHelper = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(9568)); function getInputs() { return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () { @@ -2144,6 +2145,17 @@ function getInputs() { // Determine the GitHub URL that the repository is being hosted from result.githubServerUrl = core.getInput('github-server-url'); core.debug(`GitHub Host URL = ${result.githubServerUrl}`); + // Allow unsafe PR checkout (opt-in for pull_request_target / workflow_run fork PRs) + result.allowUnsafePrCheckout = + (core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() === + 'TRUE'; + core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`); + unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository, + ref: result.ref, + commit: result.commit, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout + }); return result; }); } @@ -2284,6 +2296,7 @@ exports.getRefSpecForAllHistory = getRefSpecForAllHistory; exports.getRefSpec = getRefSpec; exports.testRef = testRef; exports.checkCommitInfo = checkCommitInfo; +exports.fromPayload = fromPayload; const core = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(2186)); const github = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(5438)); const url_helper_1 = __nccwpck_require__(9437); @@ -2732,6 +2745,97 @@ if (!exports.IsPost) { } +/***/ }), + +/***/ 843: +/***/ (function(__unused_webpack_module, exports, __nccwpck_require__) { + +"use strict"; + +var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) { + if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; + var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k); + if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) { + desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } }; + } + Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc); +}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) { + if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; + o[k2] = m[k]; +})); +var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) { + Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v }); +}) : function(o, v) { + o["default"] = v; +}); +var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || function (mod) { + if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod; + var result = {}; + if (mod != null) for (var k in mod) if (k !== "default" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(mod, k)) __createBinding(result, mod, k); + __setModuleDefault(result, mod); + return result; +}; +Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", ({ value: true })); +exports.assertSafePrCheckout = assertSafePrCheckout; +const github = __importStar(__nccwpck_require__(5438)); +const ref_helper_1 = __nccwpck_require__(8601); +const PR_REF_PATTERN = /^refs\/pull\/[0-9]+\/(?:head|merge)$/; +function assertSafePrCheckout(input) { + if (input.allowUnsafePrCheckout) { + return; + } + const eventName = github.context.eventName; + if (eventName !== 'pull_request_target' && eventName !== 'workflow_run') { + return; + } + const baseRepoId = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('repository.id'); + if (typeof baseRepoId !== 'number') { + return; + } + let prHeadRepoId; + const prShas = []; + if (eventName === 'pull_request_target') { + prHeadRepoId = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.head.repo.id'); + pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.head.sha')); + pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('pull_request.merge_commit_sha')); + } + else { + const wrEvent = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.event'); + if (typeof wrEvent !== 'string' || !wrEvent.startsWith('pull_request')) { + return; + } + prHeadRepoId = (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_repository.id'); + pushIfSha(prShas, (0, ref_helper_1.fromPayload)('workflow_run.head_commit.id')); + } + // (A) Fork PR? + if (typeof prHeadRepoId !== 'number' || prHeadRepoId === baseRepoId) { + return; + } + // (B) We cannot check for all fork PR refs so check to see + // if the resolved input points to the fork PR sha we have in the payload + const baseQualifiedRepository = `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}`; + const repositoryDiffersFromBase = input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() !== + baseQualifiedRepository.toLowerCase(); + const refMatchesPullPattern = PR_REF_PATTERN.test(input.ref); + const commitMatchesPrHeadSha = !!input.commit && prShas.includes(input.commit.toLowerCase()); + if (!repositoryDiffersFromBase && + !refMatchesPullPattern && + !commitMatchesPrHeadSha) { + return; + } + throw new Error(`Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` + + `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` + + `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching fork's code in that trusted context is a ` + + `"pwn request" supply-chain attack pattern. To opt in after reviewing the risk, set ` + + `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.`); +} +function pushIfSha(target, value) { + if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) { + target.push(value.toLowerCase()); + } +} + + /***/ }), /***/ 9437: diff --git a/src/git-source-settings.ts b/src/git-source-settings.ts index 4e41ac3..79041c4 100644 --- a/src/git-source-settings.ts +++ b/src/git-source-settings.ts @@ -118,4 +118,10 @@ export interface IGitSourceSettings { * User override on the GitHub Server/Host URL that hosts the repository to be cloned */ githubServerUrl: string | undefined + + /** + * Opt-in to allow checking out fork pull request code from a workflow + * triggered by pull_request_target or workflow_run. + */ + allowUnsafePrCheckout: boolean } diff --git a/src/input-helper.ts b/src/input-helper.ts index e0c61e2..2d20930 100644 --- a/src/input-helper.ts +++ b/src/input-helper.ts @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import * as core from '@actions/core' import * as fsHelper from './fs-helper' import * as github from '@actions/github' import * as path from 'path' +import * as unsafePrCheckoutHelper from './unsafe-pr-checkout-helper' import * as workflowContextHelper from './workflow-context-helper' import {IGitSourceSettings} from './git-source-settings' @@ -161,5 +162,18 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise { result.githubServerUrl = core.getInput('github-server-url') core.debug(`GitHub Host URL = ${result.githubServerUrl}`) + // Allow unsafe PR checkout (opt-in for pull_request_target / workflow_run fork PRs) + result.allowUnsafePrCheckout = + (core.getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() === + 'TRUE' + core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`) + + unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({ + qualifiedRepository, + ref: result.ref, + commit: result.commit, + allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout + }) + return result } diff --git a/src/ref-helper.ts b/src/ref-helper.ts index 71e8b22..8751712 100644 --- a/src/ref-helper.ts +++ b/src/ref-helper.ts @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ export async function checkCommitInfo( } } -function fromPayload(path: string): any { +export function fromPayload(path: string): any { return select(github.context.payload, path) } diff --git a/src/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.ts b/src/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..860d5ed --- /dev/null +++ b/src/unsafe-pr-checkout-helper.ts @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +import * as github from '@actions/github' +import {fromPayload} from './ref-helper' + +const PR_REF_PATTERN = /^refs\/pull\/[0-9]+\/(?:head|merge)$/ + +export interface IUnsafePrCheckoutInput { + qualifiedRepository: string + ref: string + commit: string + allowUnsafePrCheckout: boolean +} + +export function assertSafePrCheckout(input: IUnsafePrCheckoutInput): void { + if (input.allowUnsafePrCheckout) { + return + } + + const eventName = github.context.eventName + if (eventName !== 'pull_request_target' && eventName !== 'workflow_run') { + return + } + + const baseRepoId = fromPayload('repository.id') + if (typeof baseRepoId !== 'number') { + return + } + + let prHeadRepoId: unknown + const prShas: string[] = [] + + if (eventName === 'pull_request_target') { + prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('pull_request.head.repo.id') + pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.head.sha')) + pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('pull_request.merge_commit_sha')) + } else { + const wrEvent = fromPayload('workflow_run.event') + if (typeof wrEvent !== 'string' || !wrEvent.startsWith('pull_request')) { + return + } + prHeadRepoId = fromPayload('workflow_run.head_repository.id') + pushIfSha(prShas, fromPayload('workflow_run.head_commit.id')) + } + + // (A) Fork PR? + if (typeof prHeadRepoId !== 'number' || prHeadRepoId === baseRepoId) { + return + } + + // (B) We cannot check for all fork PR refs so check to see + // if the resolved input points to the fork PR sha we have in the payload + const baseQualifiedRepository = `${github.context.repo.owner}/${github.context.repo.repo}` + const repositoryDiffersFromBase = + input.qualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() !== + baseQualifiedRepository.toLowerCase() + const refMatchesPullPattern = PR_REF_PATTERN.test(input.ref) + const commitMatchesPrHeadSha = + !!input.commit && prShas.includes(input.commit.toLowerCase()) + + if ( + !repositoryDiffersFromBase && + !refMatchesPullPattern && + !commitMatchesPrHeadSha + ) { + return + } + + throw new Error( + `Refusing to check out fork pull request code from a '${eventName}' workflow. ` + + `This workflow runs with the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets, default-branch ` + + `cache scope, and runner access. Fetching fork's code in that trusted context is a ` + + `"pwn request" supply-chain attack pattern. To opt in after reviewing the risk, set ` + + `'allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true' on the actions/checkout step.` + ) +} + +function pushIfSha(target: string[], value: unknown): void { + if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) { + target.push(value.toLowerCase()) + } +}